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Shi Chen ∗,Sheng Bao †,Ling Yan‡,Cheng Huang§
Abstract
This article adopts game theory to build a model for explaining the predation behavior of
animals.We assume that both the prey and the preydator have two stratigies in this game,the
active one and the passive one.By calculating the outcome and the income of energy in different
stratigies, we find the solution to analyze the different evolution path of both the prey and the
predator.A simulation result approximately represents the correctness of our model.
1 Introduction
The difference between plants and animals is that animals have the ability to move independently
while plants do not. However, in the process of evolution, many animals lose this ability and even
become motionless. For instance, many insects who own mimicry and protective color are stolid.
On the other hand, some other animals, gain the extreme motive ability, as the felines show. What
we care about is which path is better for survival.Some other papers presented the basis on which
we build our model. [1][2]
Game theory is usually used to solve economic and social problems. In this article,we use it
investigate the behavior of animal predation.
We assume the relationship between the predator and the prey accords with the requirement of
zero-sum game. Concretely, what the predator gets from its prey is exactly what the prey loses.
Both the predator and the prey have two strategies,the active one and passive one.We will discuss
later what these strategies are. We can infer the results of these four combinations should be
different. What we really care about is that how the prey and the predator play this game to
satisfy both of them? Is there any equilibrium in the game? So we build up a model to solve these
problems.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Term Explaination
1. Player:A player is an agent who makes decisions in a game.[3]Here it means either the predator
or the prey.
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2. Strategy combinations: The predator has two ways to obtain food,to run fast in order to
catch running prey or to stay quietly so that food will come automatically.The prey also has
two ways to avoid being caught,running faster than the predator or hide themselves from
the predator’s sense.The motive one is considered as the active one while its opponent is
considered as the passive one.So the strategy combination has four possibilities.
3. Payoff: In this article,the payoff is the algebra sum of energy outcome and income.Thus, the
net income of the predator.
2.2 Assumptions
1. We do not care the relationship between animals and plants, we only focus on the predation
relationship between animals.
2. This game is a zero-sum game which means the income of the predator would be the outcome
of the prey.
3. Each play in this game is rational.
3 Building the model
3.1 Payoff of Predator
According to the assumption of Shoener[4], the income and outcome of energy of predator consist
of three parts:
1. Basic daily energyEr = k1B
3/2
2. The contained energy per unit of foodEi = k2i
2.Since the obtained food isrk4n,the total
incoming energy from food should be
∑
Ei = rk4nk2i
2
3. The energy cost on runningEp = k3B
3/2r/v. Note: Passive predator does not have this energy
output.
The variations above have biological meanings as follows:
r:The distance that a predator covers
k:Probability of finding a prey
n:Probability of killing a prey
v:Velocity of a predator
i:Scale of the prey (be porprotional to body weight)
B:Scale of the predator (be porprotional to body weight)
k1,k2,k3are parameters depend on circumstances.
Thus only when
∑
Ei − (Er + Ep) ≥ 0 the predator are able to guarantees its energy income
great than outcome.In other words, when the payoff is positive, the killing is effective. Thus
rnk2k4i
2
− (k1b
3/2 + k3B
3/2r/v) ≥ 0
2
3.2 Payoff matrix
Considering two strategies of both the predator(Player I)and the prey(Player II), we obtain the
payoff table
Escape(Active) Lurk(Passive)
Pursuit(Active) e1 e2
Ambush(Passive) e3 e4
Table 1: Payoff Table
Then we obtain the payoff matrix (
e1 e2
e3 e4
)
where ei(i=1,2,3,4) is the payoff of the predator in different strategies.
Consider the pursuit-escape strategy combination which is the simplest condition.The payoff of
predator is
e1 = rnk2ki
2
− (k1B
3/2 + k3B
3/2r/v) (1)
Then,let us discuss the ambush-escape strategy combination.The predator has no energy con-
sumption in pursuit since the prey comes into its mouth instead.Its payoff is
e3 = r’nk2ki2 − k1B
3/2
where r’ is the distance that the prey covers. r’ could be considered as the predator’s pursuit
distance.Thus r = r’So the formula can be rewriten as
e3 = rnk2ki2 − k1B
3/2 (2)
To pursuit-lurk strategy combination,because the prey uses hiding strategy, we assume the
probability of discovering the prey decreases to k − α. But since the prey gives up escaping, we
assume the killing probability then rises to n+ β. The payoff in this condition is
e2 = r(n+ β)k2(k − α)i
2
− (k1B
3/2 + k3B
3/2r/v) (3)
In the case of the ambush-lurk strategy combination, both the prey and the predator stay still.
The predator would starve to death because no food is available. Thus
e4 = 0 (4)
3.3 Biological meaning of the payoff matrix
The meaning of mixed strategies is: for a specified predator, we calculate many predation process
and see in how many times them use active strategy and how many times they use the passive one
in order to determine the evolutionary path of the predator.
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3.4 Solution of mixed strategy
According to the game theory,the solution of mixed strategy is the solution of the following equation
xe1 + (1− x)e3 = xe2 + (1− x)e4 (5)
where x is the probability that the predator use active strategy.
Substituting eq.1,eq.2,eq.3and eq.4 into eq.5,we obtain
x =
rnkk2i
2 − k1B
3/2
r(n+ β)k2(k − α)i2 − k1B3/2
Here we find an interesting phenomenon.The parameter k3 disappears. Thus,when r, n, k, k1
and k2 are fixed,x is just a function of i and B.
Meanwhile, the form of numerator and denominator is extremely similar which suggests the
range of x is not quite large. So the properαandβ are of most importance.
4 An approximate test
Since lack of data, we can not compare our theory to real condition. We perform a test based on
given values. The relationship between i,B and x is illustrated in Fig.1
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Figure 1: Test 1,r = 2000,n = 0.3,k = 0.8,v = 10,k1 = 500,k2 = 1,α = 0.2,β = 0.1
5 Discussion
The result from the model is similar with the nature. We cannot see a spider as large as a leopard
hiding in the woods and weaving its web.A such large killer must walk around or chase its victims.
Conversely, the small killer more or less chooses ambush strategy.
After reading the publication of Kleibler which revealed the velocity of mass reduction of a
hungry animal is directly proportional to its metabolism rate.And the Chossat law said that an
animal would die if it uses more than half body mass without supply in time.We can see clearly
those small animals cannot suffer hunger as the larger ones. Consequently, the smaller hunters
cannot tolerate the result of a series of failure in predation, which means death.
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Yet to the smaller predators, passive strategy is a good choice. On one hand, it guarantees the
maximum energy income(while at the same time at a high stake).On the other hand, the energy
outcome equals as low as zero. Combining these two advantages we could not say it is an undesirable
choice that so many predators hold, which then annihilate their ability of fast moving.
Nonetheless, to larger predators, it is more difficult for them to hide from the eyesight of preies.
Thus no huge payoff offered by passive hiding strategy exists any more. A careful scrutiny of the
payoff matrix represents that to large predators, their e1 almost equals e3, making passive strategy
useless.
Finally, we must point out although this article is about game theory and its biological appli-
cation, we cannot forget the basic truth that as of today, no evidence could indicate an animal can
actively select different strategies.The so-called mixed strategies are the result of long time evolu-
tion and nature selection. We hold the belief that there must be a mathematical optized solution
behind any biological behavior.
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